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The Development of Political Settlements in Tanzania:

Implications for Social Cash Transfers

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to provide a conceptual and theoretical framework for the political settlement and dynamics of social contract relations in Tanzania. The political settlement approach is employed within a theoretical framework that has been developed and applied to analyse political processes related to economic policies and development in Africa and elsewhere. Our analysis focuses on the distribution of power in Tanzanian society. Social contract theory is used to examine different regimes' relationships with Tanzania's population from independence in 1961 until the mid-1990s, when liberal reforms were introduced. The study suggests that, despite changes in leadership regimes, political settlements in Tanzania have remained remarkably stable since independence, supported by a fairly consistent social contract-type relationship between the ruling CCM elites, the state, and Tanzanian citizens. The political settlement has evolved from centralized state socialism to a mixed economy, accompanied by a range of liberal reforms that have transformed the economy and governance, and introduced multiparty competition.

Keywords: social contract, political economy, political regimes, ruling party, socialism

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ASP	Afro-Shirazi Party
CCM	Chama cha Mapinduzi
CHADEMA	Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo
CUF	Civic United Front
ERP	Economic Recovery Programme
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LCE	Leadership Code of Ethics
NCCR	National Convention for Construction and Reform
NEC	National Electoral Commission
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
ODA	Official Development Assistance
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programs
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
URT	United Republic of Tanzania
WB	World Bank

The social contract between rulers and ruled that have underpinned Tanzania's political settlements have been remarkably stable since independence in 1961, despite regime changes. Until 2015 the social contract underpinning the political settlement between the ruling CCM party elites, the Tanzanian state and the population at large was based on what Nystrand et al. (2024), drawing on (Kilonzo et al. 2019: 152), has called a *universalist ethos* of serving members of the nation state that, for long periods of time, has also included vulnerable refugee populations from Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. For a brief period between 2015 until President Magufuli's unexpected death in 2021, a more partisan form of patronage was pursued in which access to services and benefits was based more on one's allegiance to the CCM state than on earlier ideas of universalism.

The relative stability of the political settlement and the underlying social contract based on a formal ethos of universalism is surprising given the changes in the occupant of the pinnacle of power, the president of the republic: six different presidents have led the TANU/CCM party-state during quite different political eras. Over time, Tanzania has seen major political changes, moving from centralized state socialism to a mixed economy, a whole range of liberal reforms having changed the economy, the system of governance and importantly multiparty electoral competition from 1995.

Although Tanzania has been ruled by the same party since independence in 1961, its political settlements (Whitfield et al. 2015; Behuria et al. 2017; Khan 2010) have evolved over time, from a strong dominant party that controlled the state and society under the first regime of Julius Nyerere (Pedersen and Jacob, 2019) to a relatively weak dominant-party coalition under the second regime of Ali Hassan Mwinyi after 1985, as party control over the state and society began loosening because of the weak capacity to finance the CCM party-state. From the mid-1990s, under intensified liberal reforms during the third regime of Benjamin Mkapa (1995-2005) and the fourth regime of Jakaya Kikwete (2005-2015), the political settlement slowly turned into a weak dominant-party coalition with some competitive clientelist elements, increases in internal factionalism, and after 2005 a steep rise in the popularity of the opposition parties, especially CHADEMA and CUF. According to Pedersen and Jacob (2019), under the fifth regime of President John Magufuli from 2015 to 2021, an increasingly vulnerable authoritarian coalition emerged that used the security apparatus to clamp down on the opposition and attempted to reassert the dominance of the CCM party in all spheres of life. Since Magufuli's unexpected death in 2021, the former Vice-President Samia Suluhu Hassan has ruled, her term of office being marked by an attempt to balance Magufuli's hardline approach with greater flexibility and the political acceptance of differences.

Magufuli, the fifth President of Tanzania who died a few months into the beginning of his second term in office, has left behind a controversial legacy (Shivji 2021) Since his death, it has been unclear where the political settlement is heading. However, President Samia Suluhu Hassan has started by seeking to accommodate the opposition through an internal power-sharing arrangement, the formation of a taskforce to boost democracy, a discussion with the international community regarding Tanzania's economic situation, ways of deciding foreign investments, and the handling

of Covid-19 crisis. This indicates that since Magufuli Tanzania's political settlement has taken a different direction, returning more to the form and type of governance emphasized under Mkapa and Kikwete.

These changes clearly suggest that, while the political settlement might not have undergone major changes, it has seen changes in Tanzania's leaders, who they have been aligned to among different social groups and the sorts of economic system they have shaped. In contrast to these changes, the types of state–society relations they have catered for

Our analysis of Tanzania's political development and the social contract underpinning it is based on a combination of the political settlement approach (see Behuria et al. 2017; Whitfield et al. 2015), which focuses on the distribution of power in society, and social contract theory, which we will argue one can use to explore the social foundations underpinning a particular political settlement. These two perspectives and our applications of them are described below and form the basis of the analytical framework we use to understand the different regimes from independence in 1961 until the mid-1990s, when liberal reforms were extended in Tanzania.

The political settlement approach we draw on for this paper was first developed by Khan (2010, 2018) and was taken further by two research groups, one applying it to industrial policy (Whitfield et al. 2015), the other to social protection policy (Bukonya and Hickey, 2020; Lavers and Hickey, 2016). So far, this theoretical framework has primarily been developed for and applied to political processes related to economic policies and developments in Africa and elsewhere (see Behuria et al. 2017 for an overview). The framework offers an approach to comprehending the interaction between the sector-specific dynamics and the actors at sector level, as well as the broader social dynamics and alliances that may affect not only the making of policies but also their implementation in specific contexts (Khan 2010; Whitfield and Buur 2014). Originally, the framework was developed with the aim of analysing economic development nationally with a focus on the relationships among the political and economic elites that affect the distribution of power and rents in a society (Behuria et al. 2017). The political settlement framework has increasingly been adapted to and used for studies at the sector level that take into consideration the broader political economy dynamics in which they are embedded (Buur et al. 2020).

Essentially, the political settlement approach analyses how the distribution of power within a society affects political and economic outcomes.¹ It analyses power relations among the elites, as well as between different elite groups and their factions and between the ruling elite and those outside it.

A basic assumption and starting point for political settlement analysis is that the ruling elite is interested in staying in power and that, in order to do so, it has to balance the different interests within society. The ruling elite consists of those who make decisions in a society, or more specifically 'the group of people who wield power as a result of their position in government, where they occupy offices in which authoritative decisions are made' (Whitfield et al. 2015: 24; Buur et al. 2017: 46). The elite can consist of members of the ruling party at different levels of society, the president or a broader group of individuals, depending on where power is located in a particular society. Following Behuria et al. (2017), the distribution of power in society is analysed

¹ Political settlements involving the distribution of power in society shape the ruling elites' ability to change institutions and implement policy. They put limits on what they can do, given their assumed interest in staying in power and therefore their need to balance the different interests in society. Applying this framework makes it possible to understand why certain policies are adopted and others are not, and even more importantly, to what extent policies are actually implemented, rather than remaining paper products or circulating references (de Sardan, 2011).

along three dimensions: the vertical, the horizontal and the financial. Lavers and Hickey (2016) have emphasized two additional dimensions that are articulated less in the original political settlement approach: the role of ideology and ideas, and the role of external actors.

The vertical dimension concerns the power distribution within the ruling coalition. As suggested above, the phrase ‘ruling coalition’ refers to those groups in society that support the current ruling elite and that the ruling elite rely on to stay in power. The vertical dimension has two aspects worth mentioning. First, it is important to understand the relationship between the top ruling factions and the lower-level factions, as few or no elite groups have uniform support in society. Second, as pointed out by Whitfield et al. (2015), it is often forgotten that ruling elites are rarely coherent but consist of different factions perhaps based on history, family membership, ethnicity etc., and they are usually in competition with each other over rents and resources (Khan 2018; Buur et al. 2023). The horizontal dimension concerns the relationship between the ruling elite and excluded factions, i.e. those groups in society that are excluded from power, either because they oppose the ruling elite or because the elite ignores them. Important questions in relation to the horizontal dimension include how strong the excluded factions are, how are they kept excluded, and how this affects the ruling elite’s ability to take decisions. The vertical dimension is important for understanding the internal competition and cohesion or rivalry within the ruling coalition, while the horizontal dimension is important for understanding the degree of vulnerability the ruling coalition faces (Whitfield et al. 2015).

An important aspect of any analysis of a political settlement includes how it is financed (Behuria et al., 2017), as the way most low-income developing countries’ economies are put together means that the formal economy cannot provide sufficient resources for the reproduction and survival of ruling-elite coalitions (Khan 2010; 2018; Salimo et al. 2020: 1220). Unlike high-income capitalist economies, which are normally able to generate sufficient surpluses and revenues to sustain the regime, low-income countries rely to a great extent on informal, extra-legal resources and rents that are typically orchestrated by using the state and its control over the government to create and protect spaces for rent-seeking (Behuria et al. 2017; Salimo et al. 2020: 1221). The notion of rents in this understanding refers to incomes that are higher than they otherwise would have been if market dynamics had been followed. Rents include, but are not limited to, ‘monopoly profits, subsidy transfers organized through the political mechanisms, illegal transfers organized by private mafias, short-term super profits made by innovators and so on’ (Khan 2010: 5). From this broad definition of rents, different types of rent can be deduced, such as monopoly rents, natural-resource rents, rents based on transfers, innovation rents and learning rents. As Khan suggests (ibid.), transfers organized through or using ‘political mechanisms’ are prevalent in low-income countries, often serving as the basis for accumulation where public or collective assets, resources and goods are converted into private assets or goods.

This dimension is often difficult to analyse due to a lack of access to information. In many low-income countries, economic decisions are taken under the purview of changing donors and international financial institutions. Fluctuating raw mineral or agricultural prices, international donor and foreign investor strategies, new donors like China and Russia and a radically changing aid architecture can all be highly important in ensuring that a political settlement can be made

viable economically. It is clear that, even though the focus in the political settlement approach is often firmly on understanding domestic politics, external actors, such as international aid and financing organizations and multinational companies, can have quite a significant influence. This is particularly the case in debt-ridden and/or aid-dependent countries with little power in the global political economy, as is often the case in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Here the importance of development donors and finance in promoting particular ideas and approaches to the issue of social cash transfers (Lavers and Hickey 2016) and aid in general has been highlighted.

Finally, as Lavers and Hickey (2016) have pointed out, ruling elites are affected not only by the interests of different groups, but also by ideas or ideologies, both their own and those of others. Hence, as in this paper, this dimension needs to be included when trying to understand how a particular political settlement has evolved and what characterizes the social contract underpinning it. As we shall describe further in Section 3, important ideas formulated after independence regarding state–society relations still have considerable traction today.

In addition to the dimensions along which political settlement can be analysed in Khan’s (2010) statement, Whitfield et al. (2015) further developed four analytical types of political settlements: competitive clientelism, vulnerable authoritarianism, a weak dominant party, and potentially a developmental coalition or a strong dominant-party coalition. We will briefly present them here but must also make it clear that we see them as meso-level theoretical constructs that should assist further analysis. As such they do not have much predictability, as one of the interesting features highlighted by Behuria et al. (2017) and Buur et al. (2020, 2023) is that the same type of political settlement can have different outcomes for different sector studies in a particular country, just as different types of political settlement can have equal outcomes across different countries. The typology is therefore predominantly a heuristic analytical tool that we relate to possible developments in Tanzania for each typology.

A potential developmental coalition/strong dominant party is characterized by a strong ruling elite with a low degree of opposition both internally and from excluded factions. In this type of political settlement, the ruling elite has strong enforcement capabilities, and the regime is relatively stable. South Korea during the 1960s has been cited as an example of this type of political settlement. In some respects, Tanzania had many of the same features after independence, but as the economy spluttered the Nyerere regime ran into problems.

A weak dominant party coalition means that the ruling elite faces a few powerful excluded political factions and that the ruling coalition consists internally of either strong higher-level or lower-level factions. This type of political settlement has a low degree of vulnerability in the sense that the political survival of the ruling elite is not immediately threatened. On the other hand, a lot of resources need to be channelled either to other elite factions to keep the coalition together and/or to the lower-levels of the coalition to maintain support. This means that the demands from various factions within the ruling coalition are difficult to stem, and therefore the efficient implementation of policies is often constrained due to competing interests. Nyerere’s last phase and all the post-

Nyerere regimes from Ali Hassan Mwinyi after 1985 via Benjamin Mkapa (1995-2005) to the Jakaya Kikwete regime (2005-2015) can by and large be argued to resemble this type of regime.

A *vulnerable authoritarian coalition* is characterized by strong excluded factions whereby the ruling elite uses force or legal restrictions to retain its grip on power. Such a political settlement can have a strong enforcement capacity, but it is vulnerable to violent overthrow. Several of the early regimes in Uganda, for example, the Obote and Amin regimes, could be seen as falling into this category. The late Magufuli regime can also be used as an example of this type of regime in many ways, even though the regime lacked the resources to implement policies fully except through coercion.

The *competitive clientelist coalition*, on the other hand, is characterized by strong excluded political factions that challenge the ruling coalition, while internally the ruling coalition is characterized by fragmentation among the ruling elites. This type of political settlement is characterized by a high degree of vulnerability and rivalry. Internal factionalism means that substantial resources need to be used up in implementing distributional policies to keep the coalition together. During a brief stint under Kikwete up to the 2010 elections, internal CCM competition for the right to stand for parliament threatened to turn the regime into a competitive clientelist regime. As internal competition for positions was partially suppressed, the turn towards competitive clientelism receded.

As with all analytical constructs, these typologies are a simplification, and real-world examples often fall between categories. Furthermore, changes in political systems are always gradual, meaning that a country can have traces of more than one type of political settlement at any specific point in time. As the analysis that follows will show, Tanzania's political settlement has traces of strong dominant party coalitions, weak dominant party coalitions and competitive clientelism, though there is also a strong tendency towards a higher degree of CCM party dominance and control.

The political settlement approach focuses on the organization and distribution of power in society and shows how this may shape relationships with different included and excluded factions. This approach does not directly focus on the relationships that ruling elites create with the population in general outside the double lens of included and excluded factions related to the opposition. The broader question is whether the way in which a particular political settlement evolves can say anything about the way in which the social contract between ruler and ruled more generally takes form or different forms? Is there for each political settlement a specific social foundation that crystallizes in a form of social contract that encompasses the inclusive and exclusive dimensions of all groups and individuals in society? We cannot provide satisfying answers to these questions here and merely suggest possible trajectories of relevance to the Tanzanian case.

As Buur et al. (2020, 2023) have suggested regarding the political settlement approach, the specific political settlements in Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique have not shied away from using violence and coercion to maintain elite power, promote specific policies and deal with increased

electoral competition after liberalization during the mid-1990s. Indeed, they have drawn on “violence rights as sources of holding power” (Behuria et al. 2017: 508, 511), which can be important in coercion, maintaining power and/or changing the positions of different groups in the national topography of power.² This is important, as we shall show later with regard to the iconic Ujamaa policy in Tanzania, where rural residents were forcibly moved to urban centres, where access to welfare services was provided.³ But does this mean that the underlying social contract between rulers and ruled is necessarily coercive in nature? Maybe not, or rather not all the time or at all times. Based on the case of Tanzania, coercion has surely been prevalent at different points in time, but it is not the only game in town.

We know from the literature on publicly managed cash transfers that ruling elites often use social cash transfers in partisan ways to benefit included factions or to induce potential new factions to join them, or even to punish other population groups (Brooks 2015; Buur and Salimo 2018; Hickey et al. 2018; Seekings 2012; Van de Walle 2014; Vom Hau 2012).

As Nystrand et al. (2024) argue, this can be based on a partisan, patronage-based social contract distributing solely to those who support the regime or the governing elite or those they wish to favour. Patronage-based social contracts can be quite exclusive or narrow, for example, based on elite clientelism, in which case patronage does not find its way down patron-client networks to benefit the non-elites (Van de Walle 2007). However, they can also take the opposite form: for example, when lower levels of the clientelist network or the ruling coalition are stronger, they can pressure the higher levels to deliver benefits, jobs and services in order to maintain their political support and thus remain in power. This kind of clientelism can be quite redistributive, even though it is basically still based on exclusion (Whitfield et al. 2015).

Nystrand et al. (2024) contrast this typical form of the developmental state with a social contract working along more universalist lines. The universalist social contract, Nystrand argues, means that all members of the polity have, at least formally but possibly also informally, the right to provisions and services and can expect to be included whenever possible when there are sufficient resources. This universalist ethos, which could also be seen as a form of mass clientelism, we would usually expect to find in its strongest form in Western electoral social democracies (Hickey, 2012), but as Porisky (2022) suggests, this is also the case in Tanzania.

The fact that the political settlement approach does not specifically deal with the social foundation of a political regime is not a problem, as it easily can be analysed as an important aspect of the social foundation of a given political settlement. With regard to the CASH-IN programme, we argue that social contracts in the countries we are analysing have evolved historically along different pathways that link the respective countries’ political settlements with their social

² The notions of holding power and organizational power come from Khan, who focuses on ‘the distribution of power across organizations that are relevant for analysing a specific institutional or policy problem’ (Khan 2018: 4). Holding power depends on the relative strength of organizations (Ibid. 6) and different groups’ ability to forge coalitions with other actors and organizations, as Pedersen and Poncian (2024) suggest.

³ The political settlement approach implies that ‘the accumulation of violence rights often goes hand-in-hand with the accumulation of wealth’ (Behuria et al. 2017: 520), which seems to speak directly to the Tanzanian case, if in different ways.

foundations. These are understood here as the relations of the social contract they are both embedded in and the political settlement they help reproduce over time.⁴ We suggest that linking the approach to social contract theory is important specifically when dealing with social cash transfers by both public and private organizations, as it means taking the informal and formal institutional foundations seriously.

The general literature on social contract theory, in contrast, allows a clearer way of analysing relations between the ruling elite and the non-elite population (the rulers and the ruled). The social contract concept is old, having been used by early social scientists such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau (Nystrand et al. 2024). The central idea is that relations between the rulers and the ruled are based on mutual rights and obligations. This does not necessarily refer to legal contracts, although they can be codified in constitutions and laws, but it can also entail informal relational agreements, or the mutual expectations and actions that give legitimacy to the arrangement of power in society (Nystrand et al. 2024).

Nugent (2010: 43–44) suggests a typology of social contracts that are common in African nation states, including the ‘coercive’, ‘productive’ and permissive’ social contracts. Nugent suggests that real African states exhibit traces of several forms of social contract at any given time. The coercive contract denotes a situation in which the legitimacy of the rulers rests primarily on force and fear, whereas the productive contract denotes a situation where there is a degree of interchange between the rulers and the ruled, implying a notion of ‘collective goods’, including access to resources and ‘spaces for deliberation’ between the rulers and the ruled. The permissive contract denotes a situation in between the two previous forms, whereby there is a combination of strong-arming on the part of the ruler and engagement between the rulers and the ruled. All three forms should be seen as ideal types.

Hickey (2012) categorizes social contracts on the basis of the ideational foundations and expressions of social contracts. He distinguishes between the liberal/interest-based and the social/rights-based views of social contracts. From the perspective of the liberal/interest-based view, the social contract tends to be seen more in legal terms, as a series of agreements between individual, rational agents or actors. From the social/rights-based perspective, the social contract is seen as broader than legal agreements, as it focuses more on relations than on the individuals themselves, including exchanges of promises. Hickey’s (2012) point with this theoretical typology is that the different ideational foundations of social contracts can be translated into very different social policies.

Cash transfers potentially have a large effect on the social contract in a society by constituting a resource that the ruler ‘gives’ to the ruled, which creates expectations, relations and possibly the legitimacy of power. Building on Hickey (2012) and Nugent (2010), we can explore how different views and different manifestations of social contracts interact with the implementation of cash-transfer programmes and projects, as well as with the distribution of power in society, as explored through political settlement analysis.

⁴ What we suggest is a more precise and workable solution than Kelsall et al.’s (2022) attempt to link political settlement analysis to the social foundations.

As part of our political settlement analysis, we will explore when it becomes possible what the relationship between the ruling elite and the citizens has consisted of. This is particularly useful in relation to welfare provision and social services, including social cash transfers, as in many ways these types of policy have the potential to constitute an important tool for the ruling elite in shaping their relationship with the general population, possibly strengthening the non-coercive dimensions of the social contract. The paper continues by presenting a thorough political settlement analysis of Tanzania at one time period and with one regime at a time so as to relate developments to the implications for social cash transfers.

In 1961, political independence was granted to Tanganyika (later renamed Tanzania) under a multiparty political system. Multiparty elections had been held in 1958-59 and 1960, and TANU had regularly won almost all the parliamentary seats. For instance, in the 1960 election, TANU won all the seats except one, which went to a former TANU member running as an independent.⁵ Hence the elections had made Tanganyika a *de facto* one-party state (Baregu 1997; Kweka 1995), along with the constitutional change in 1965 following the 1964 union with Zanzibar.⁶ As one of these changes post-colonial Tanganyika was renamed Tanzania and a formal one-party-state system was adopted with a highly centralized executive presidency (Shivji 2021). These changes made the Tanganyika, later Tanzania African National Union (TANU) the only legally recognized political party in the country.

In the post-colonial era, the overarching project became nation-building aimed at unifying the religious, ethnic and socially different groups in the country. This involved the promotion of Kiswahili as a national language used as “a unifying force in Tanzania” (Porisky 2022; see also Leonard 1987; Collier 2010; Lofchie 2014; Miguel 2004; Ndulu et al. 2019). In contrast, Green (2011) suggests that Kiswahili is less important. As we show below, this involved the centralization of political control to avoid patronage-based politics (as it is known in Uganda and Kenya), where political coalitions can be forged along ethnic, religious or regional lines. Such political articulation was actively discouraged within the polity of Tanzania’s 120 ethnic groups. As we also suggest below, the unifying language of the Nyerere government informed the creation of what we have called a ‘universalist ethos’ or a ‘strong sense of national citizenship, that cut across ethnic, regional and religious divides’ (Porisky 2022: 216). This ideological dimension to nation-building was the main pillar of Nyerere’s legitimacy, including after he stepped down as

⁵ TANU became Chama Cha Mapinduzi (or CCM, which translates from Kiswahili as the Party of the Revolution) after its merger with Zanzibar’s ruling party, Afro-Shirazi, in 1977.

⁶ The union was between two sovereign countries under the leadership of the then Presidents Julius Nyerere (Tanganyika) and Abeid Aman Karume (Zanzibar). The constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977 provides for the existence of both the Union Government and the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar. Article 2(1) of the Constitution provides that the territory of the United Republic consists of the whole of the area of mainland Tanzania and the whole of the area of Tanzania Zanzibar, including territorial waters. Article 34(1), (2) and (3) of the Constitution provides for the existence and authority of the government of the United Republic. Zanzibar has two main islands, Unguja and Pemba.

president in 1985, but continued as chairman of the CCM until 1990. By then Tanzania had one of Africa's most formidable state-party machines and had become highly bureaucratized (Shivji 2021).

The most important policy framework underpinning the nation-state project was the Arusha Declaration of 1967, which was incorporated into the country's Constitution under Article 9 and in principle informed all the other laws passed by the legislature. This came in part as a response to what Nyerere considered the slow pace of economic, social and political change after independence, when Tanzania was 'captured' in colonial structures of underdevelopment (Jennings 2003: 164) with a need to counter its own district development trajectory (Rugumamu 1997: 122). At its core was Nyerere's developmental vision for Tanzania of building a socialist society based on the clear idea of 'self-reliance' (Svendsen 1969: 151).

With the Arusha Declaration, the Nyerere regime took control of the major means of production through the nationalization of private property, including major bank and strategic industries. However, it also clearly suggested that state-centralized investments could not work without investments in rural areas, including in agriculture, social services and education for economic and social development.⁷ Following the Arusha Declaration and the policy of villagization, most prominent was an attempt – by and large successful, at least in rural areas – for top CCM elite factions to forge relations with lower-level factions within TANU/CCM. The party tried to reorder the rural areas after the Arusha declaration, with widespread consequences even at the present day.

The post-independence era also saw radical changes away from the African socialist tenets of the Nyerere era of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. The second President, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, who ruled from 1985 to 1995, oversaw profound changes towards a more liberal and pragmatic approach to democratic governance and the economy, largely under pressure from donor agencies (Van Cranenburgh 1996). While changes were made, the CCM also made sure it was done at a pace and with a set of rules of the game that allowed it to reproduce its power over time.⁸

Tanzania has had five new constitutions since 1961, and it adopted a permanent constitution in 1977. The Constitution of 1962 marked the beginning of the presidential system, which vested the

⁷ Based on political challenges during the mid-1960s, the Arusha Declaration was revealed to be a deliberate move. TANU was re-established on a new basis to avoid the fate that had come across other nationalist parties in Africa in the mid-1960s. Moreover, the Leadership Code of Ethics (LCE) was used as yardstick to foster the commitment of political leaders from the top down (Coulson, 1982: 177-179). The basic principles of the LCE highlighted by Mujumba (1999), which were also embraced in TANU's constitution, are: 'Every TANU and government leader must be either a peasant or a worker, and shall in no way be associated with the practices of Capitalism or Feudalism; No TANU or government leader shall hold shares in any Company; No TANU or government leader shall hold directorships in any private enterprise; No TANU or Government leader shall receive two or more salaries; No TANU or Government leader shall own houses for rent.'

⁸ The National Assembly passed the Political Parties Act No. 5 of 1992 to reintroduce multiparty democracy due to urban elite pressures on the one hand and to fulfill the conditions of the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) to undertake economic and political liberalization (Gibbon, 1995; Havnevik, 1993) on the other. The first multiparty general elections were held in 1995.

president with considerable executive power. Given President Nyerere's popular legitimacy, he

1990, clear signs of competition and struggles within the CCM's top factions became clear, as many elite groups shifted party affiliations after 1992, where they became the leaders of most of the emerging opposition parties (Whitehead 2000).

The presidential ambitions of CCM leaders were one source of the factional struggles within the party, which, during the Mwinyi period, became associated with the Zanzibar faction. Signs of factional struggles within the ruling party persisted, and this trend did not end with the reintroduction of multipartyism in 1992, which instead exacerbated competition further. In order to please state and party leaders' ambitions under the new constitution, the second regime under Mwinyi lifted the Leadership Code so that state and party leaders could engage in 'business ventures', thus formally opening political office up to the accumulation of personal wealth. The Nyerere idea of a principled leadership started to erode, with party-state national elites frequently occupying both the political arena and the economic sphere.

In order to assert the new party-state's control over the post-independence society and its institutional structures, as mentioned above an elaborate party-state bureaucracy was installed running from the power centre of Dar es Salaam through the main urban centres and down to village level. The Arusha Declaration was passed by TANU/CCM in 1967 and solidified Nyerere's developmental vision for Tanzania (Goulbourne 1979; Nyerere 1977). The Arusha Declaration included mainstreaming party institutions with the civil service (Msekwa 1976) and making the CCM the final authority in all matters of society and the state, as stipulated by Article 3(2) of the constitution. The unitary project had at its centre the *Ujamaa* policy, which acted as a strategy of political reform to change colonial legacies. As pointed by Makulilo (2012), its aim was to restructure the political and socio-economic structures that had been established before independence. Under these colonial structures, social services were unequally accessed, unequal access to land and resources was reproduced after independence, and the country depended heavily on external aid. Thus, the creation of a classless society from which individuals could enjoy the country's resources equally was the main purpose of socialism in Tanzania, with *Ujamaa* as its key foundation.

Based on socialist principles, *Ujamaa* attempted to reorganize the rural areas so that they fitted the modernizing ideas of the ruling party. The scale of the project was massive. Estimates suggest that by 1972 there were at least 4,500 *Ujamaa* villages all over Tanzania, though that suggests that fewer than 15% of the rural population lived in *Ujamaa* villages. This included newly built villages as well as existing villages converted to *Ujamaa* villages (Porisky 2022: 224). In contrast, in 1977 over 85 percent of the rural population were living in *Ujamaa* villages (Tripp, 1997, p. 47). After 1973 this was made possible as the initial *Ujamaa* villagization project came to be targeted, and the entire machinery of the state was mobilized, turning *Ujamaa* into a system of 'compulsory, universal villagization' (Scott 1998: 234). The infamous 'Operation Vijiji' or Operation Villagization by the Tanzanian state was based on the forcible relocation of rural populations into *Ujamaa* villages, with local party militias demolishing traditional homesteads to force people to relocate for villagization. The spectre of violence was sanctioned by the state and was used to

relocate rural populations forcibly and destroy their homes so they would not return (Phillips and Smith 2018; Kjekshus 1977; Matango 1975; Porisky 2022). The Ujamaa villagization project dramatically reworked state-society relations, with consequences that are still felt today.

'*Ujamaa*' (literally 'family' in Swahili, especially 'extended family', or the process of a person becoming a person through the people or community) is underpinned by '*kujitegemea*', which can be translated as 'self-reliance'. Part of this was the much-criticized villagization program, which aimed to create 'urbanized' centres in the rural areas, where the party-state could mould the 'backward' peasant (due to tradition, ethnic or religious affiliation) to become a proper Tanzanian, later translated as 'citizen' (Kilonzo et al. 2019: 152). As villagization and self-help were tightly linked, they conditioned access to social assistance. The forceful attempt to settle the country's rural population in state-designed villages based on centrally designed housing and local economic planning required the target population to participate actively in their own uprooting and re-rooting. In this way, villagization was identified as the only acceptable way of accessing social services and welfare, including obtaining inputs for communal farming. Therefore, it was never a matter of fully free access to service and welfare, but was based on the idea of self-help and acceptance of the state as provider and facilitator, which triggered state assistance and inputs. This is important to emphasize, as it formed part of how ideas concerning universal access related to cash-transfer projects were later crystalized. However, because *Ujamaa* citizens came to have high expectations of the public social services provided by the CCM state, central to this was the *Ujamaa* villagization programme and the CCM government's rapid expansion of social welfare in the two decades after independence as part of these programmes (Wangwe and Rweyemamu 2001: 5-6; Porisky 2022: 232).

Tanzania's development, therefore, rural as well as urban, was to be built by members of both the nation and the state (see Porisky 2022: 219). State-citizen relations captured in the 'new' social contract after independence can best be described as based on state control over associational life. Over time, this formed a part in producing a universalist ethos for access to free social services such as health, education and water for all members of the nation state, including the establishment of pension funds for certain strata of the population (see Nystrand et al. 2024). The universalist ethos or principle of providing for people in need merged with a general culture of supporting people in crisis in order to build national unity.

The state-driven African form of socialism, which at its core saw the state as the driver of change, harnessed strong social relations that to a very large degree still exist today and that initially stimulated socio-economic development in the 1960s and 1970s, based on state subsidies and tariff-setting (Gray 2013; Rweyemamu 1979). As Tripp argued, the use of the state as laid down by the Arusha Declaration gave the state a special role:

The state was to be the great equalizer. The state would intervene in the economic life of the nation to ensure equality, the well-being of all citizens, and the prevention of exploitation and the accumulation of wealth in order to create a classless society. (Tripp 1999: 48)

One example saw women's elite groups being given a share of special seats, around 30% of the total number of elected constituency members for parliament (Yoon 2008). This translated into women's support for the ruling party in both rural and urban areas (Babeiya 2011a), support that has lasted until today.

Thus, as Shivji (2021) has pointed out, four key features of the relations between the population, the party and the state that crystalized during the post-independence era can be identified, which we would argue are today dominant to a different degree. First, the organs of the CCM had their foundations at the grassroots level in villages and at street level in urban centres, being run through party branches, ten-cell organs and related organs at the district, regional and national levels. Second, party and army structures worked concomitantly on social integration, sometimes in quite forceful ways. Third, the ideational underpinnings of the CCM were fairly clearly spelt out and formally enacted as the basis for establishing a new society based on the value of unity among the nation states' members, facilitating CCM decision-making. Fourth, difference in general was not easily accommodated, and the political factions that had a different ideology and proposed political ideas that were at odds with the CCM visions could not easily be accommodated inside or outside the CCM. If manifestations of difference emerged, they were temporary and issue-based or issue-oriented.

However, the socialist planned economy pursued after independence in 1961 failed. As we argue below, this put the CCM regime under pressure to such an extent that not only was the economy in crisis by the late 1970s, but crisis became entrenched during the 1980s. This led to economic and political reforms during the second political regime of Ali Hassan Mwinyi from 1985 to 1995, which created new openings in which civil society NGOs could act.

With the ruling CCM taking control of society and the economy, there was little if any real and possibility for political candidates to effect policy outputs during the TANU or CCM postcolonial eras. As the one-party polity established itself, candidates competed for positions based on personalities rather than policies or platforms. The system eroded transparency and accountability, and increased apathy, as many voters regarded voting as a waste of time (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992). Despite the centralizing tendencies, this did not cause growing resistance to the ruling CCM during the 1960s and 1970s. Instead outside groups were either closed or integrated into the CCM. For instance, in 1968 the East African Muslim Welfare Society, an independent religious organization, was banned over political fears, while students', youth and women's organizations were all brought under the wing of the ruling party.

Julius Nyerere is often praised for how, in contrast to Uganda and Kenya, Tanzania was able to create and maintain 'a national culture' that to some extent promoted certain levels of tolerance and diversity in religion, ethnicity and race (Tripp 1999: 66). However, this did not extend to multi-party politics, which came to demarcate the limits of the inclusive state-building project. Within the TANU/CCM discourse, inclusive nation-building rhetoric and redistributive policies dominated, and the Nyerere government was to a considerable extent able to address the most pertinent regional inequalities and increase access to social services and welfare. This indeed

helped create a sense of national equity and a universalistic ethos. However, it should not be forgotten that this ethos was exposed at the same time through the various laws that limited ethnic and religious organizations. The limits of the inclusive project were based the suppression of ethnically based demands, which were indeed often a proxy for the suppression of local demands and voices when they could not be addressed in and through the CCM state.

During the 1980s and early 1990s, interest groups started to emerge, including academics, break-out groups from the political elite and from civic institutions such as the Chamber of Commerce, farmers' groups, workers and cooperative unions. Some of these groups were no longer satisfied with the existed political arrangements (Shivji 2021). For instance, due to a crackdown on perceived economic sabotage during the 1980s, Augustine Mrema⁹ of the NCCR-Mageuzi enjoyed the support of business people with direct links with the ruling party (Maliyamkono and Bagachwa 1990; TEMCO 2001). According to Babeiya (2011b), business people wanted to revamp the status quo by supporting the most popular opposition party that emerged, for example, Mrema with his political party, such as the NCCR-Mageuzi. However, it is worth noting that Nyerere's views were influential and vital in setting the limits to political debates within and outside the ruling coalition during his first and second periods of office (Van Cranenburgh 1996). Based on the respect he enjoyed, his name was used to solicit public support and was reported to be effective in Tanzania. Surprisingly, as mentioned by Babeiya (2011b), supporting the opposition was regarded as being anti-Nyerere, particularly by the elders. Thus, political and economic controls were gradually moved to party expansion with a bureaucratic management system, while other powers were transferred to workers and peasants (Shivji, 1976).

In the early 1990s, during the liberal opening, there was a significant delay in legalizing the opposition parties, which allowed the CCM to mount a recruitment campaign and consolidate its grip over society. The CCM had a strong financial resource base inherited from past government subsidies, which, even though it was formally discontinued after 1992 (Van Cranenburgh 1996), was still favoured by the Tanzanian state. Access to finance for opposition parties' leaders was restricted and came from the founding leaders distributing finance in and through their predominantly urban-elite networks (Whitehead 2000). In order to manage political campaigns, each candidate running to be a Member of Parliament was supported financially, though access to finance was not even (Van Cranenburgh 1996). Thus political parties, particularly opposition ones, did not have a broad array of financial contributors, which affected their organizational development (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992).

The experience of the first multiparty election in 1995 revealed that it had certainly not created a united opposition in Tanzania. Opposition parties remain relatively fragmented, weak and seemingly disorganized, and had acted in varying capacities since early 1990s (Whitehead 2000). Mmuya (1998), Whitehead (2000) and Katundu (2018) associated the poor performance of the

⁹ However, some businessmen who belonged to the private sector were working closely with nationalized firms. For instance, Jayantilal Keshavji Chande was appointed general manager of the largest milling factory, the National Milling Corporation, and maintained close relations with the CCM throughout the *Ujamaa* and liberalization eras. Despite diversified investments from the private sector being vital, open political relations between the state and the Asian-Tanzanian businessmen become increasingly difficult towards 1995 (Gray 2013).

opposition parties with multiple internal weaknesses which limited their institutional development. Some of the issues highlighted include over-dependence on the personal finances of the party leaders, which could result from factional fighting and the personalization of power; the lack of a party philosophy or ideology; formation and organization on the basis of informal methods of decision-making; and a lack of internal democracy. Hence there was weak communication between party leaders, supporters and the general public, which questioned the clear participation of key stakeholders.

The widening of the space for multiparty democracy during the 1990s, with the emergence of multiple parties, emanated from domestic urban elites and international forces. The new liberal democratic opening was surrounded by a number of challenges. While some groups, particularly in the urban centres, considered political reform a natural implication of economic liberalization, the CCM's grassroots did not see the same need for political reform, particularly in rural areas. Other disadvantages were related to the 1965 Constitution, which had formally established the one-party system. The continued influence of this Constitution placed important obstacles in the way of popular participation outside the realm of the state and the CCM. This created the foundation for political coercion and entrenched state/-CCM-based clientelism. As Van Cranenburgh argued (1996), it is clear that the CCM shaped the rules of the democratic game in favour of itself, including but not limited to heavy requirements for party registration and limited access to the media and organizational resources for groups outside the party. Although the National Electoral Commission (NEC) was supposed to be neutral, the electoral system was strongly biased towards the ruling party. This further translates into less power outside the ruling coalition when combined with other obstacles, such as a total refusal to provide civic education, as recommended by the Nyalali Commission,¹⁰ in order to benefit from a population in need of education in multi-party competition. The post-1980 process of democratization therefore squandered a fairly good opportunity to encourage public participation that could keep the CCM government accountable to the public.

For these reasons, the second political regime of Ali Hassan Mwinyi from 1985 to 1995 was characterized by continuing to limit internal opposition and reorganizing the lower-level factions while keeping economic independence weak (Pedersen and Jacob 2019). Moreover, the strong dominance of the ruling-party coalition was also characterized by several other factors. For instance, Babeiya (2011) pointed out that, in terms of the age of supporters, the CCM enjoyed substantial youth support during the 1995 general elections. After the democratic opening, the ruling CCM coalition therefore continued to dominate just as had been the case during the post-independence era. The relationship between party, state and population that was institutionalized after independence to a large extent continued to be important.

¹⁰ The Nyalali Commission was a Presidential Commission charged with constitutional reform. The Commission was established in 1991 by President Ali Hassan Mwinyi with a mandate to investigate and recommend changes to the administration and management of justice in Tanzania, which was considered to be in need of reform. The recommendations of the Commission laid the groundwork for the subsequent development of multiparty democracy in Tanzania. The commission recommended the establishment of an independent judiciary, the strengthening of civil-society participation in the justice system and the promotion of human rights and the rule of law.

In contrast to how the post-independence period is often associated with widespread nationalization, almost 50% of all industries remained in the hands of the private sector, and new parastatal investments were set up in the form of joint ventures under public–private partnerships (Bigsten and Danielson 2001). According to Gray (2013), businesspeople such as general managers of the National Milling Corporation, created in 1976, maintained close relations with the CCM throughout the Ujamaa and liberalization eras.

The internal source of revenue used to finance these regimes came mainly from taxing rural-based agricultural production. Poll taxes levied by local governments were reported to be the dominant source of revenue, though their importance tended to diminish between the 1980s and 1990s under the Mwinyi regime. One of the main reasons for the fall in revenue from poll taxes was the debate over the controversial 1991 parliamentary decision to exempt women from paying the tax (Tripp, 1997). Fjeldstand and Therkildsen (2008) further suggest that, from the colonial period to the period under Mwinyi, poll taxes caused tensions and conflicts, hence jeopardizing state–society relations by catalysing rural rebellions. The often coercive local taxation strategies have led central governments to abolish taxation, as electoral competition became more important. Aid money played a significant role by financing more than 50 percent of development activity (Voipio and Hoebink 1998).

After independence, the role of public finances became instrumental. The public financing of wide-ranging social policies, with direct and indirect support to state-driven economic priorities, infrastructure development and public services were key beneficiaries (Gray 2015). During the first political regimes under Nyerere, the socialist planned economy aimed to transfer economic power from foreign and non-indigenous capitalist groups to African economic groups under the tutelage of the state. Nonetheless, the role of private investment and good collaboration with the state were strongly applauded by Nyerere in 1968 (Gray 2013).

Both Nyerere and later Mwinyi organized and financed the regime through administrative controls over the allocation of resources, goods and services, while public sector-led development was pursued at the expense of the private sector. As already mentioned, Nyerere generally attempted to nationalize the economy, which was mainly agricultural, with a clear positive trend in some of the selected key macroeconomic indicators (see Table 1). Under the period of Mwinyi, with tightened fiscal policies and the tax evasion scandal of 1994,¹¹ the relationship with Tanzania’s donors deteriorated mainly due to perceived fiscal mismanagement, corruption and the limited democracy in Tanzania (Voipio and Hoebink 1998). Generally, the government’s track record under the first two regimes showed that revenue collection had picked up, though expenditure grew considerably more slowly than revenue. The ratio of fiscal deficit to GDP declined, reaching

¹¹ To be eligible for HIPC debt relief, the IMF requires a track record of six years (two successive three-year IMF programs). In the case of Tanzania, the IMF has been highly inflexible in interpreting Tanzania’s track record. According to Oxfam International, which was among the observers, it was estimated that since Tanzania had introduced far-reaching economic and political reforms and followed the adjustment programs with good discipline and good results as early as the mid-1980s (with the exception of the tax-evasion scandals of 1994), it had already proved eligible for HIPC and deserved to be rewarded for its good performance (see Oxfam, 1998).

a small surplus in 1995 (World Bank 1997). This put the CCM state under pressure as a result of the 1970s and 1980s *Ujamaa* policies, when the state had expanded human welfare. However, the costs of building and maintaining public infrastructure alone, not to mention training health and education workers, were considerable and far exceeded the state's capacity.

1975	296	17	12	n.a	39	81
1980	667	35	12	n.a	55	132
1985	487	44	17	n.a	49	170
1990	1,175	46	32	83	70	89

resources at independence combined with poor institutional capacity (Gray 2015). More difficulties were reported in terms of the way political settlement was financed due to the complexity of relations between existing and emerging non-indigenous capitalist groups and political elite groups during the Mwinyi era towards the 1990s (Bigsten and Danielson, 2001).

Thus internal revenue collection was limited and, as Table 1 suggests, there was a regime financed by external sources with about 100% of development expenditure externally financed by donor groups. The mixture of limited internal revenue collection and external financing made it increasingly difficult for the Nyerere regime to control policy. As Gray (2013) argues, a nation state needs to have a political elite that can mobilize resources in the form of the rents necessary to finance the institutions and balance power relations in order to survive. Towards the end of the 1970s the Nyerere regime began struggling economically.

The opening towards a free or mixed-market economy started to emerge during Nyerere's last term, but it has mainly been attributed to the Mwinyi regime (Fouéré 2014). The failure of one-party states in eastern Europe and elsewhere in Africa questioned and also cut short the limited transfers of resources and put pressure on the future of the Tanzanian one-party system. Pressure from donor agencies since the end of the 1970s, combined with deteriorating economic conditions, led the ruling party to adopt economic reforms from the early 1980s. At first these were domestically crafted, but as the economic crisis expanded and international donors reduced international aid, the Nyerere regime by the mid-1980s was being forced to accept a series of loans from the IMF and the World Bank (Voipio and Hoebink 1998). The attached conditionalities were clearly seen as 'an infringement on Tanzania's sovereignty' (Barkan 1994: 28) and as a new form of colonialism. The different structural adjustment programs (SAPs) implemented between 1982 and 1988 had major macroeconomic consequences. They included forced 'currency devaluation, maize subsidies reductions and limitations on state expenditure on social services and welfare programs' (Porisky 2022: 232). The programme was aimed at tightening fiscal, monetary and exchange-rate policy to restore the growth and dynamism of the national economy.

After Nyerere stepped down in 1985, the new government of Mwinyi intensified the World Bank and IMF-sponsored Economic Recovery Programme (ERP). This lasted three years and devastated social services and infrastructure investments, while largely failing to alleviate the country's economic problems (Voipio and Hoebink 1998). Furthermore, economic and political liberalization did not bring the expected results, with industrial output shrinking considerably from the 1980s to 1995 (Semboja and Kweka 1998). But government spending on social services and welfare and their quality declined throughout the 1980s and 1990s, with international donors pushing for the implementation of cost-sharing for social services. This led to the introduction of user fees for education in 1986 and user fees for health-care in 1993. The result was reduced enrolment in primary and secondary schools, and reduced quality of health-care and education. This was combined with significant increases in private health-care facilities and private schools (Manyama 2017; Wangwe and Rweyemamu 2001; Porisky 2022: 233). It was concisely argued that 'the emphasis on equity and access' that was prevalent throughout the *Ujamaa* period were 'increasingly superseded by [a] greater focus on issues of quality and management systems' (Porisky 2022: 233).

It is often argued that ideologically Ali Hassan Mwinyi, who took over after Nyerere's retirement, was more open to the liberal demands of the international donor community, including the World Bank. This may be correct, but the economic situation at the time he took over was dire, and it is difficult to see any other policy options that could have allowed the CCM to continue its rule. Ndulu et al. (2019: 114) clearly suggest that the partly forcible 'political liberalization was [...] carried out in such a way as to reinforce rather than threaten national integration' and thereby the CCM's continued control. Political liberalization after the mid-1980s did create controlled spaces for opposition parties, as well as a host of civil-society organizations and formally a free press, in contrast to the more direct suppression after independence. Moreover, the liberalization on which the country embarked after the mid-1980s meant that government spending on social services and welfare declined throughout the 1980s and 1990s. This trend would nonetheless be reversed when direct budget support by the international donor community was mainstreamed from the 2000s.

Under Nyerere's political regime, the most important ideological formulation was captured in the Arusha Declaration, passed by TANU in 1967, and with continued importance for the CCM until today. It was championed as taking onboard socialism and self-reliance as the relevant post-liberation ideology. It valued the political 'consensus' achieved through TANU/CCM over multi-party 'competition' (Nyerere 1966). Nyerere's one-party doctrine has had a lasting effect on how Tanzanians' view state–society relations and in a broad sense 'democracy', with the dominance of the idea of one-party rule making the ruling party the most important institution from independence until today.

The Independence Constitution (1961) and the Republican Constitution (1962) both claimed to create an 'imperial presidency'. The Interim Constitution of Tanzania (1965) created the one-party state, and more legal power was added in 1975 through Act No. 18 of 1975 amending Article 3 of the Interim Constitution of 1965 guiding all political activities in the country. The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977 consolidated changes, mostly associated with the birth of the CCM as a result of the merger of TANU and ASP from the Tanzanian mainland and Zanzibar respectively (Makaramba 1997; Nyirabu 2002). The country entered into economic and political liberalization from the mid-1980s, but the right to participate in national political affairs is still monopolized by the CCM (Mongela 2007).

One-party rule was not peculiar to Tanzania at the time, as similar single-party-state formations monopolizing politics have also occurred in Mozambique, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, among others (Quigley 1992). In this regard, multiparty politics, formally legalized under the Political Parties Act of 1992, were the result of the pressure from both domestic urban elites and international forces. In order to legalize a multiparty democracy, Nyerere influenced national debates about political pluralism in 1990, in which the low level of Tanzanians demanding democratization was realized by 77% of voters, acting out of fear of instability. However, in 1983 the attempt to democratize was begun by the ruling party, though in the post-independence period several attempts to do so were made by the state trying to control society (Nyirabu 2002).

Moreover, opposition political parties performed relatively well and posed a real challenge, particularly NCCR-Mageuzi under the leadership of Augustine Mrema, which forced the ruling party, the CCM, to push for a change to the electoral rules from an absolute majority to a simple majority (Babeiya 2011a).

Maybe more important because of its consequences for how social cash transfers would be understood later, the idea emerging out of *Ujamaa* and the form of socialism pursued after independence were associated with self-reliance – ‘ujamaa na kujitegemea’ – (Nguyahambi et al. 2019: 79), which continued to be important despite the liberal transformation and globalization. This is what Nguyahambi et al. (2019) also refer to as ‘mageuzi na utandawazi’, literally ‘reforms and globalization’, which seemed to become dominant for a period. With these ideational changes, new ideas about the rights of citizens and the responsibilities of the state began to emerge, which later took the form of ideas about social protection and cash transfers to those in need of assistance.

State-society relations evolved after independence to be mainly organized in and around first TANU and then the CCM. Tanzania experienced a non-violent struggle that brought independence in 1961. Leaders of the struggle emerged from organized protests, non-cooperation with government policies, and trade unions, and they were all absorbed by the ruling party TANU/CCM or else lost any standing (Gray 2015).

Post-independence institutional problems with a scattered, predominantly rural population were met by the development of a bureaucratic party-state structure down to the village level, giving the party-state control of society (Goulbourne 1979). Party structures were mainstreamed with the civil service (Msekwa 1976). In this regard, the main aim of the permanent constitution was to strengthen TANU/CCM in accordance with Article 3(2), which made the party the final authority in respect of all matters in the country linking elites and non-elites. The remains of these developments are still present today, even if contested.

The universalist ethos that was expressed, for example, through the use of the historical Uhuru Torch has preserved strong ties between the ruling party and Tanzanian society, particularly in rural areas, up until today. If socialism harnessed strong social relations during the 1960s and early 1970s, the SAPs (ERPs) of the 1980s supported by the World Bank and IMF put the universalist ethos under pressure. Even though traditional arrangements to provide support, associated with ethnicity, in crisis situations had a continued existence, and although older policies related to special residences for elders have persisted since independence, the mediating role of the party-state has continued. In this regard it can be argued that social relations did not evolve significantly from the Nyerere’s first political regime of to Mwinyi’s second due to the prevalence of the same dominant organs from the national level to the rural level.

Despite continuities, there is no doubt that the conditions of the SAPs imposed by the IFIs with limited funding for social services and welfare not only constrained a key legitimizing aspect of the CCM governance model. They also undermined state control with a decline in government control of the population during the 1980s. The social contract in the form of state-society relations

became increasingly complicated (Antonucci et al. 2017). One way of understanding the scope of these changes is to consider the novel phenomenon of the ballooning of NGOs, religious organizations and local welfare organizations that emerged after the liberal opening (Lange et al., 2000; Tripp 1999, 2000; Wilk-Mhagama 2016). The economic crisis of the 1980s saw an avalanche of ‘social’ organizations partly outside the control of the CCM in the form of private institutions, religious organizations, local self-help organizations and a variety of district-level development associations (including previously banned local ethnic and regional welfare associations) to provide ‘services’ that the state or government were no longer able to provide. For example, as Porisky argues:

‘The number of NGO schools tripled between 1984 and 1992. The number of NGOs operating in Tanzania expanded rapidly during the 1990s to provide education, health-care and other social services in light of the government’s failures. Between 1993 and 2000 the number of registered NGOs in Tanzania increased from 224 to 8,499. The increase in the number of NGOs was driven not only by the economic crises and the SAPs, but by the shift in funding practices by the international donor community who sought to circumvent ‘inefficient and corrupt state bureaucracies in order to channel their aid through international and locally based NGOs’. Porisky (2022: 233)

Our review noted that the social contract-type relations between the first two regimes were relatively similar, with strong state-society relations being catalysed by the *Ujamaa* and Uhuru Torch ideologies. In this regard, the long-standing universalist ethos was not challenged by the first two presidents. Thus, patronage-based politics were generally narrow, a possible necessary condition for the social contract to evolve as it did along with the idea behind and general ethos of universalism. The neoliberal approach and associated market reforms from the mid-1980s therefore had little influence on how the social contract developed, even though the international donor community started to feature strongly in Tanzania and financed large parts of the national budget from the 2000s, which has implications for our study of social cash transfers.

Paper two of this political settlement analysis will deal specifically with developments after 1995, when liberal reform of the social, political and economic spheres accelerated, in part driven by internal dynamics and in part by external pressures from the world economy, international donors and financial institutions.

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